Author: Gershon Ben Keren

Imagine you walk into work tomorrow and nobody acknowledges you. Nobody says hello, or asks you how you’re feeling, or what you did last night etc. During meetings nobody asks you what your thoughts or opinions are, and when you leave for the day, nobody even notices you’ve gone. If this just lasted a day, you’d probably get over the awkwardness you felt, however it lasted for a week, it would likely be upsetting, and if it happened for months or years, it is likely that it would change both how you see yourself, and how you see other people. One of our most basic human needs is the need to matter. When people believe they are insignificant, invisible, or disposable etc., the consequences can range from depression and withdrawal to resentment, grievance, and, in some circumstances, violence. The need to matter has developed throughout our evolutionary past and has led our brains to treat social exclusion as physical pain. In fact, neuroscience has shown that social rejection activates many of the same brain regions that are involved and associated with physical pain. In the small hunter-gatherer groups that formed our early communities, being excluded often meant that we had less protection, less access to resources and a reduced chance of reproduction etc. Our survival was somewhat tied to our ability to matter and be significant in some way. Lose that and we become somewhat less human.
Anti-mattering is something more than loneliness - we can be lonely but still feel that we matter e.g., we may have felt at times in our life such as when we first moved to a new town or city that we were lonely, but we had the awareness that we still mattered to the friends and/or family members that we used to associate with and belong to. The foundational work on “mattering” as a psychological construct is generally credited to Morris Rosenberg and B. Claire McCullough, who introduced it in 1981. They defined “mattering” as the perception that a person is significant to others; that others are aware of them, care about them, and depend on them. This was developed primarily in the context of adolescent mental health and development. Nancy Schlossberg then extended the idea of mattering into adult developmental psychology and transition theory during the 1980s and 1990s, applying it to experiences like career transitions, retirement, and major life changes etc. Her work emphasised how much the experience of mattering, or not mattering, shapes how people navigate significant changes. However, it was Gordon Flett, working primarily from the 2010s onward who shifted the emphasis on “mattering”, in two important ways.
Firstly, Flett argued that anti-mattering is not simply the absence of mattering but a qualitatively distinct and more actively damaging experience, i.e., being made to feel invisible, burdensome, or contemptible is different from simply not feeling significant. Secondly, he connected this more explicitly to mental health outcomes including suicide and pushed for mattering and anti-mattering to be taken seriously as clinical and public health concepts rather than remaining primarily in developmental psychology. He was also careful to distinguish anti-mattering from low self-esteem and/or depression, though these can all occur together. The specific toxicity of anti-mattering is that it is relational and perceived as externally imposed; it is not simply that a person feels bad about themselves, but rather that they feel others have rendered them insignificant, often deliberately. This external attribution makes it more likely to produce outwardly directed responses, including violence, rather than purely inward ones like depression or withdrawal. People don’t simply want to be liked, they want to believe that they contribute, are remembered, are valued and make a difference etc., which explains why retirement affects some people profoundly, and why redundancy can hurt far beyond financial loss.
Anti-mattering’s most direct connection to violent-offending runs through what Arie Kruglanski calls significance quest theory, which overlaps considerably with Flett's work. This postulates that when people feel they have been rendered insignificant, not just overlooked but actively made to feel they are a burden or a non-entity, violence can become a means of forcing acknowledgment. The act itself, however destructive, is experienced as a restoration of significance. This pathway appears most clearly in mass casualty events, where perpetrators frequently leave manifestos explicitly framing their actions as a response to years of being ignored or dismissed. This when anti-mattering becomes grievance, with the shift from, “I don’t matter”, to “they don’t care”, signaling a shift from internal reflection to seeking an external audience to blame. It’s not that such potential offenders are seeking revenge but rather that they want to be recognized.
Extremist movements frequently recruit from populations experiencing anti-mattering, offering exactly what Flett identifies as the core need i.e., a community in which a person is seen, valued, and explicitly told that they matter, and that they matter to a cause larger than themselves. The violence that follows is therefore not simply ideologically motivated but is partly a continuation of the significance-seeking that the recruitment process began and exploited. This explains why ideological content is sometimes less important than the belonging and recognition that a group provides.
Anti-mattering doesn’t occur overnight. It is an accumulation of repeated rejection, humiliation, and exclusion that happens over time. Whilst an act of violence may appear to occur suddenly, its build up has been gradual as a “grievance identity” develops and takes form. Whilst it may appear that the opposite to violence is “peace”, from a personal safety perspective it should perhaps be seen as “significance”. When people believe they matter, they invest in relationships, communities, and the future, however, when they believe they don't matter, there are those who quietly withdraw, and then those who look for another way to prove their existence and significance.